


# International Scientific Conference **Political Clientelism** in the Western Balkans

**09-11 December 2020**

**Book of abstracts**

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**DAY 1**

**9 DECEMBER 2020**

**(WEDNESDAY)**

**OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE**

**10.00 - 10.20h**

**Bojana Naumovska**, Director of ISPJR-UKIM  
**Gjergj Murra**, Executive Director of the Western Balkans Fund (WBF)  
**Pande Lazarevski**, Head of Political Science and Legal Studies Unit at ISPJR-UKIM  
**Jovan Bliznakovski**, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje

**PANEL I CLIENTELISM IN ELECTIONS**

**10.20 - 11.50h**

Chair: **Aneta Cekikj**,  
(Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)

**'Buy One Get One Free':**  
**Gender and Vote-buying in Montenegro**  
**Olivera Komar** (University of Montenegro) and  
**Nemanja Batrićević** (Central European University)

**Pride and Prejudice:**  
**Corruption and Distributive Politics**  
**Albana Shehaj** (Harvard University)

**Varieties of Political Clientelism:**  
**A Typology of Patron- Client Linkages and Exchanges in the Western Balkans**  
**Jovan Bliznakovski**  
(Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)

**PANEL II CLIENTELISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

**12.15 - 13.45h**

Chair: **Dragan Stanojević**  
(University of Belgrade)

**Corruption, Clientelism, Informality and Elections in the Context of a Transition Economy**

**Drini Imami** (Agricultural University of Tirana and Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education – Economics Institute Prague)

**The Interplay of the Economic and Political Elites in Serbia: Factors of Intragroup Economic Differentiation**  
**Anđelka Mirkov and Željka Manić**  
(University of Belgrade)

**Active Political Engagement, Political Patronage and Local Labour Markets – The Example of Shkoder**  
**Elvisa Drishti and Bresena Koplaku**  
(University of Shkodra “Luigj Gurakuqi”)

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**10 DECEMBER 2020  
(THURSDAY)**

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**10.00 - 11.30h**

**Chair: Jelena Pešić**  
(University of Belgrade)

**Prêt-à-porter Clientelistic Networks:  
Do They Exist Before or Independently  
of Parties in Contemporary Serbia?**  
**Danilo Vuković and Dušan Spasojević**  
(University of Belgrade)

**The Characteristics of the Neo-patrimonial  
Form of Governance in Serbia –The Status  
and Relationships Between the Chief  
and Local Sheriffs**  
**Nemanja Krstić** (University of Niš)

**Neopatrimonialist Practice as a Soft  
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**Dardan Beqiri**  
(Independent researcher)

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**12.00 - 13.30h**

**Chair: Jovan Bliznakovski**  
(Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)

**Discursive Strategies of "Normalisation" of  
Clientelism among Young Members of  
Political Parties in Serbia**  
**Dragan Stanojević**  
(University of Belgrade)

**Everyday State-Capture:  
Patronage Politics and the Client-Masses'  
Role. Evidences from the Balkans**  
**Arianna Piacentini**  
(EURAC research Bolzano)

**Investigation into the Potential for  
Clientelistic and Corruptive Behavior of  
Students of Private and Public  
Universities in R.N. Macedonia**  
**Ivona Mileva, Marjan Bojadjiev and  
Miodraga Stefanovska - Petkovska**  
(University American College Skopje)

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**Moderator: Jovan Bliznakovski** (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)

**DAY 3**

**11 DECEMBER 2020**

**(FRIDAY)**

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(University of Tirana)

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**How to Keep Religious Actors Loyal:  
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(University of Tirana)

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(Sant' Anna School of Advanced Studies)

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Albanian Case.**  
**Elira Luli** (Albanian University)

**CLOSING OF THE CONFERENCE**  
**16.20 - 16.30h**

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

**PANEL:**  
**CLIENTELISM IN ELECTIONS**

**9 December 2020**  
**10:20 - 11:50**

**Chair: Aneta Cekikj**  
**(Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)**

# **‘Buy One Get One Free’: Gender and Vote-buying in Montenegro**

**Olivera Komar (University of Montenegro) and  
Nemanja Batrićević (Central European University)**

A study based on a list experiment which was conducted after Local elections in Montenegro in 2018 estimated that 24% of people were offered money for their vote. Additionally, this study revealed an interesting gender perspective on the issue. Namely, a multi-level model which included ‘gender’ as one of the controls shows that being a woman reduces your likelihood of being offered money for your vote by 18%. Gender “survives” as a significant predictor of vote-buying in a company of number of individual (ethnicity, income, education, employment, rural/urban, age, tendency towards reciprocity) and locality level (political competitiveness, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ethnic composition, power composition, unemployment rate...) variables. This finding challenges literature about the economic empowerment effect of vote-buying on women and reveals another dimension of selectiveness of clientelist exchange. Having in mind scarce and somewhat contradictory literature that studies gender perspectives on vote-buying, this paper further explores the role of gender in voter targeting and proposes further directions of research.

**Keywords: gender, clientelism, vote-buying, family voting, voter targeting**

**Olivera Komar** is an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Montenegro. Her interests include elections, party politics and political behavior. She is principal investigator in Montenegrin National Election Study, Comparative Electoral System Study for Montenegro (2012, 2016), as well as the national coordinator for European Social Study in Montenegro (2018).

**Nemanja Batrićević** is a PhD candidate in Comparative Politics at the Central European University. His main research focuses on political psychology, in particular psychological underpinnings of ethnic politics, inter-group relations, and political decision making.

# **Pride and Prejudice: Corruption and Distributive Politics**

**Albana Shehaj (Harvard University)**

Political corruption is a critical impediment to the success of transitioning democracies. Persistent corruption jeopardizes economic growth and delays democratic developments. Yet, voters are unwilling to vote out corrupt parties consistently, even while rising in protests and expressing indignation at the pervasiveness of political corruption. In this article, I study electoral backlashes against corruption by examining the link between corruption perceptions among voters and distributive policies incumbent parties use to assuage voter demand for electoral accountability. I present a theory of “corruption compensation”: corrupt incumbents strategically target higher shares of government resources to regions where corruption perceptions are higher and voters can credibly threaten to withdraw their electoral support. Using original, subnational data from Albania, I show that high corruption perceptions reduce incumbent support among voters, but resource provisions mitigate this effect. The findings supplement the electorate-based theories of distributive policies and contribute to an emerging literature on the political economy of distributive politics.

**Keywords: accountability; corruption compensation; distributive policies; democratization**

**Albana Shehaj** is a research fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and Methodology from the University of Michigan. Her research focuses broadly on comparative and international political economy with an emphasis on distributive politics, democratization, accountability, and International Organizations.



# **Varieties of Political Clientelism: A Typology of Patron-Client Linkages and Exchanges in the Western Balkans**

**Jovan Bliznakovski (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)**

The literature on political clientelism has identified several dimensions of variation of clientelist linkages and exchanges. Some researchers of traditional clientelism differentiate between short-term and long-term clientelist relationships (e.g. Scott 1972, 100; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 252-256), with the former being understood as one-shot exchanges and the latter as iterated ones. The same distinction has been recently applied in the contemporary democratic setting, with Nichter (2010; 2018) and Gans-Morse et al. (2014) differentiating between electoral and relational clientelism. Mares and Young (2016; 2018), on the other hand, differentiate between types of inducements deployed by patrons in political clientelism, establishing the distinction between positive (rewards) and negative inducements (threats, sanctions) in clientelist exchanges. Finally, some researchers differentiate between exchanges initiated by patrons and exchanges initiated by clients (Powell 1970; Nichter and Peress 2017; Nichter 2018). The previous research of political clientelism thus reveals a substantial variety of exchanges and under a single category, indicating the need for conceptual clarity when assessing the phenomenon.

This paper develops a typology of clientelist linkages and exchanges, applicable to the Western Balkan region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo\*, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia). In doing so, the author relies on the previous conceptual work in the literature outlined above, as well as on empirical data from the Western Balkans. In order to describe the varieties of political clientelism in the region, the author utilizes quantitative survey data and data from qualitative semi-structured interviews with citizens and informality “insiders” gathered by the project “Closing the gap between formal and informal institutions in the Balkans” (INFORM) (2017-2018); data from semi-structured interviews’ with experts gathered by the author (2019-2020); as well as data from secondary sources.

The typology developed in the paper distinguishes between short-term (electoral) and long-term (patronage) exchanges which, as the typology reveals, serve different objectives for the two actors in the clientelist relationship. Following the typology and the empirical findings, patrons in the Western Balkan region engage in political clientelism through vote-buying, turnout-buying, abstention-buying, rewarding loyalists and request fulfilling; while clients through vote-selling, turnout-selling, abstention-selling, party serving and clientelist benefit-seeking. In outlining these different forms of engagement, the paper aims to contribute to conceptual clarity in assessing different types of clientelist linkages and exchanges forged between patrons and clients in the Western Balkans.

**Keywords: clientelism, patronage, Western Balkans, typology**

**Jovan Bliznakovski** is a political scientist with a PhD from the University of Milan, Italy and an M.Sc. from the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. He currently works at the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje (ISPJR-UKIM). Bliznakovski's current research is focused on political clientelism in the Western Balkan region, while, in the past, he has worked on inter-ethnic accommodation in Macedonia, while focusing on language and educational policies. He is the author of the Nations in Transit reports on Macedonia for the 2017, 2018 and 2020 editions, as well as former programme director of the leading Macedonian think-tank, the Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" Skopje (IDSCS).

**PANEL: CLIENTELISM AND  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

**9 December 2020  
12:15 - 13:45**

**Chair: Dragan Stanojević  
(University of Belgrade)**

# **Corruption, Clientelism, Informality and Elections in the Context of a Transition Economy**

**Drini Imami (Agricultural University of Tirana and Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education – Economics Institute Prague)**

Corruption is commonly identified as a defining characteristic of transition/post-communist economies, along with neo-patrimonialism and clientelism. Typically, patron politicians mobilise political support and financial resources, which are needed to consolidate power, by creating and distributing rents and property rights, often in corrupt ways. In developing (and transition) countries, elections are often the arena that reveals the relative organisational strength of competing patron-client factions. Recent evidence has shown that the introduction of electoral institutions per se has not contributed to eliminating clientelism, or making elections and political movements more programmatic. The aim of this contribution is to gain a better understanding of the interaction between corruption, clientelism and elections in the context a post-communist transition economy. We analyse the expected observable potential consequences of election-related corruption in order to shed light on the manifold relationships between corruption, clientelism, informality and elections.

**Keywords: corruption, clientelism, informality, elections**

**Drini Imami** has earned the PhD in Agri-Food Economics and Policy at the University of Bologna in 2011, and the academic title “Associated Professor” from the Agricultural University of Tirana since 2013. Drini has conducted research in several leading European research institutions and contributed to more than 70 scientific publications and more than 60 technical reports. Research interests include agriculture economics, behavioural, political and institutional economics. He has worked as a consultant for FAO, SNV, World Bank, EBRD, GIZ, different USAID and EU projects, etc., and has coordinated several research projects.

# **The Interplay of the Economic and Political Elites in Serbia: Factors of Intragroup Economic Differentiation**

**Anđelka Mirkov and  
Željka Manić (University of Belgrade)**

The paper examines the intragroup differences in the economic position of the economic and political elites in the context of growing social inequalities during the consolidation of the capitalist order in Serbia. The aim is to determine which factors affect the increase in household income within the two elite strata, thus contributing to intragroup economic differentiation. Particular attention is paid to access to appropriate interpersonal and political networks through friendships with those in an elite position or membership of a political party. The analysis is based on data collected by the Institute for Sociological Research of the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy in surveys conducted on representative samples consisting of 163 respondents from the economic elite (2012) and 192 respondents from the political elite (2015). Multiple linear regression was used to test the hypothesis that interpersonal and political networks contributed to the total annual household income of the members of the elite strata. The statistically significant predictors of the household income level in the case of the economic elite are the respondents' higher rank, ownership of a private enterprise and party membership, and in the case of the political elite – the respondents' higher rank, permanent residence in Belgrade and having a close friend among the members of the elite strata. The results demonstrated that the interplay of the economic and political elites significantly impacted on economic differentiation mediated through economic benefits for the members of both elite strata. The business owners and managers who are engaged in political networks are more likely to have higher incomes than those who do not maintain mutual contacts between the members of the economic and political elites. The political party representatives who have close friendships with others belonging to the elite strata also have a tendency to enjoy higher incomes. The findings may be interpreted as an indication of the considerable influence of interpersonal and political networks on the economic differentiation at the top of the social hierarchy in Serbia.

**Keywords: economic elite, political elite, income, interpersonal and political networks**

**Anđelka Mirkov** holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy. She is a Research Associate in the Institute for Sociological Research at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy. She works on the project “Challenges of New Social Integration in Serbia: Concepts and Actors”, funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of

the Republic of Serbia. Her main research interests include social sustainability, economic and housing inequalities, classes and elites.

**Željka Manić** holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy. She is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Philosophy. She participates in the project “Challenges of New Social Integration in Serbia: Concepts and Actors”, funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. Her research is focused on sociological research methodology, economic inequalities, classes and elites.

# Active Political Engagement, Political Patronage and Local Labour Markets – The Example of Shkoder

**Elvisa Drishti and  
Bresena Koplaku (University of Shkodra “Luigj Gurakuqi”)**

This paper sets out to gain an understanding on the effects of active political engagement on the long term career trajectories of workers in Shkoder. We use primary quasi-longitudinal data collected from a sample of 191 actual and graduated students from the University of Shkoder that record month-to-month employment states for a 3 consecutive years (2012 – 2015) period and apply a difference-in-difference data analysis method with the treatment being July 2013 and afterwards. The results provide evidence that active political engagement is significantly related to labour market outcomes by means of direct effects for employment in the public sector and by means of indirect effects for the private sector and self-employment. Other important factors such as social capital, including friends and family members in political networks, also play a role in shaping labour market transitions to employment in the public sector and career advancements not justified by human capital. The results of this study suggest that for individuals working in the public sector (controlling for education), previous labour market status had no impact on the probability of working in a public sector job.

**Keywords: political patronage, Shkodra, well-being, sequence analysis, career transitions**

**Elvisa Drishti** is a full-time lecturer and researcher at the Department of Business Administration of the University of Shkodra. She was awarded her PhD degree from Birmingham Business School in June 2019 under the supervision of Prof Fiona Carmichael. She was also a CERGE-EI Career Integration Fellow and a Teaching Fellow currently. Her research area is largely concerned with labour economics/employment studies and focuses on the prevalence and consequences of insecure employment in Albania and other countries in Europe.

**Bresena Koplaku** is a lecturer and researcher at the Department of Geography, Faculty of Social Sciences since 2000. She has earned a Doctoral degree in Human Geography from the Faculty of History and Philology at the University of Tirana in migration studies. Her main research area is focused on migration in Albania, return migration, transnationalism and diaspora. Current research is concentrated mainly on migration – development nexus and policy issues linked to the effects of migration in the Albanian society.

**PANEL:**  
**CLIENTELISM FROM THE**  
**PATRONS' POINT OF VIEW**

**10 December 2020**  
**10:00 - 11:30**

**Chair: Jelena Pešić**  
**(University of Belgrade)**



# **Prêt-à-porter Clientelistic Networks: Do They Exist Before or Independently of Parties in Contemporary Serbia?**

**Danilo Vuković and Dušan Spasojević (University of Belgrade)**

Serbian political system has often been described as “partocracy” due to the decisive role of political parties in political, social and economic life. Political parties with their strong political leaders are perceived as key drivers of clientelism. Research data show that, besides them, actors in clientelistic networks are business people and managers of public enterprises and intermediaries (brokers). They exchange information, tenders, financial resources and control mechanisms. Like in other authoritarian clientelistic regimes, these networks violate fundamental democratic principles of accountability or even create inverse channels of accountability and para-state structures.

In this article, we aim to offer an explanatory model for understanding the workings of clientelism in Serbia. Our argument is based on preliminary desk analysis of data from not less than 20 municipalities in Serbia. These initial findings will be supplemented by in-depth interviews with local stakeholders from politics, civil society and public life in no less than 4 municipalities.

Using available media reports and official data, we have analyzed careers of key political actors in these settings and identified some common patterns. Many of them were able to retain power for a long period of time and despite political changes. They often shifted from one power holding position to another (this involves changing party membership, often called “overflights” (Serbian: preletači) and the media sometimes report on complete local party structures transferring from one to another political party).

Using these initial findings, we want to test an explanatory model through a qualitative survey. In brief, the model assumes that they were able to remain in power because they were leading local clientelist networks (or being their members) that exist independently of party structures. At municipal levels, these clientelist networks are composed of individuals tied by permanent common interests and not necessarily by common and stable party affiliation. Wider networks through which resources are controlled include directors of public enterprises and entrepreneurs. These networks are permanent and move from one party to another and they do it for utilitarian reasons (as adaptive political and economic strategies). Hence, they exist before and independently of political structures and often political parties utilize these networks as they acquire power. Or, viewed from the other side, networks often utilize party structure to pursue interests of their members and retain control over local resources. Local networks would not be able to persist without corresponding political system, but there is a dual dynamic in their creation and functioning: local, one that exists

before or independently of political parties, and another one, tied to a wider clientelistic political system.

Such distribution mechanisms are in line with the theoretical reasons for the emergence of informal institutions: (1) institutions are weak and underdeveloped, including those of the political system, most notably weak and unstable party structures; (2) the culture of informality is widespread and is coupled with authoritarian political culture (one may even argue that the entire modern history of Serbia is characterized this model of distribution); and (3) economic resources are limited and the redistributive role of the state and political actors is strong.

**Keywords: clientelism, local clientelistic networks, political system, Serbia**

**Danilo Vuković** is Associate Professor in Sociology at the Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade. He has conducted research in the following areas: access to justice and free legal aid (Serbia, 2012 and 2013), the process of passing laws and designing public policies (Serbia, 2012 and 2013), government accountability and the rule of law (Serbia and Cambodia, 2014 and 2015, as the London School of Economics and Political Sciences Fellow), legal culture in Serbia (2014 and 2018), the legal profession in Serbia and Croatia (2018 and 2019). His recent publications include: Danilo Vuković and Marko Mrakovčić. Legitimacy, Independence and Impartiality: How Do Serbian and Croatian Legal Professionals Assess Their Judiciaries? *Europe Asia Studies* (forthcoming); Marko Mrakovčić and Danilo Vuković (2019). "Internal" crisis of judiciary? Attitudes of members of legal profession in Croatia and Serbia towards judiciary in their countries. *Politička misao* 56 (1): 75-105; Vuković, Danilo and Slobodan Cvejić (2019). Attitudes Towards the Rule of Law in Contemporary Serbia: A Coherent Legal Culture. *Jahrbuch für Osteuropa* 60 (1): 203-221; Svetislav V. Kostić, Danilo Vuković (2019). The perfect silence: an empirical study on how ignorance and lack of critical debate effect the process of enacting tax legislation in Serbia. *Annals of the Belgrade Faculty of Law* 57 (1): 69-94; Danilo Vuković (2018) „The Quest for Government Accountability and Rule of Law: Conflicting Strategies of State and Civil Society in Cambodia and Serbia“, *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 2018, 29(3): 590-602; Danilo Vuković and Marija Babović (2018) „The Trap of Neo-patrimonialism: Social Accountability and Good Governance in Cambodia“, *Asian Studies Review* 42: 144-160; Danilo Vuković (2017). "The Hollowing Out of Institutions: Law and Policymaking in Contemporary Serbia" In: Fekete Balays and Gardos-Orosz Fruzsina (eds.) *Central and Eastern European Socio-Political and Legal Transition Revisited*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, pp. 155-175.

**Dušan Spasojević** is an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade. His main areas of interest are political parties, social cleavages theory, civil society, populism and the process of transition in post-communist societies.

# The Characteristics of the Neo-patrimonial form of Governance in Serbia – The Status and Relationships Between the Chief and Local Sheriffs

Nemanja Krstić (University of Niš)

In the literature, the neo-patrimonial form of governance is usually tied to societies which are undergoing a process of transformation. Firstly, the concept was used to analyze the postcolonial social circumstances in which the breakdown of initial ideological or institutional models of modernization leads to the establishment of central government as a source of the overall social and moral order of the society (Eisenstadt, 1973). The representatives of the newly established order, the main elite, focus their political activities on establishing control of the main spheres of social life. This includes taking primacy in defining external relations in society, as well as the monopolization of the resources crucial for the creation and realization of social policy which is directly responsible for its distribution among the citizens of a particular state.

The tendency is toward the centralization of power in the hands of individuals or a network of individuals who hold formal positions of power, among whom there is a strong formal and informal hierarchy; however, it is not the only characteristic of the social transformations of the postcolonial type. This form of governance is also a possible scenario in the social contexts which occur due to the incomplete democratic transitions which began in the 1990s, and which created a kind of “hybrid political regime” (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Erdmann, 2002). The characteristic of the neo-patrimonial form of governance in societies with established formal institutions (the government, parliament, judiciary, police, military, educational system, etc.) is that centralization of power must take place with a parallel system of informal institutions and practices. Individuals who hold the main executive positions of power through the establishment of informal networks of support and exchange of resources constitute government based on patrimonial, paternalistic and patriarchal principles (Weber, 1978).

The focus of this paper will be on several aspects of the neo-patrimonial form of governance in Serbia, derived from 11 interviews with insiders from the political milieu. Generally, it is a system of personal connections and relationships based on dependence between the central (chief) and local ruler (sheriffs); the mechanisms of appropriation of public services with the aim of personal management of public resources; a minimization of the access of broader social groups to political and economic resources which represent the foundation of political domination; the elimination of formal responsibility of the ruler; the privatization of administrative systems and the public media; the centralized control of key social resources; and the formal creation of new types of social organization and institutions, while management of social life takes place in the domain of the informal.

**Keywords:** neopatrimonialism, informal networks, Serbia, chief, local sheriffs

**Nemanja Krstić** holds a PhD in Sociology and works as an Assistant Professor at the University of Niš, Department of Sociology (several courses: Sociology of family, Sociology of Religion, Social pathology, Social stratification, Contemporary Sociological Theory) as well as a researcher at the Center for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe. He specializes in cultural studies in particular studies of cultural identities, symbolic boundaries, family practices and religiosity. He has worked in a number of research projects, dominantly related to symbolic struggles, informal practices, life strategies, cultural inequalities and issues of the scientific career of young scientists.

# **Neopatrimonialist Practice as a Soft Strategy of State Capture: The Case of Western Balkans**

**Dardan Beqiri (Independent researcher)**

Three decades since the beginning of the democratization process and the emergence of the illusion of the ultimate triumph of democracy over any other system and two decades since the pacification of the Western Balkans region, despite large investments by Western actors to democratize this space, the region continues to oscillate between democracy and authoritarianism.

Thus, although the polities in the region have adopted liberal-democratic legislation and also installed the institution of elections, nevertheless behind the 'illusionist curtain' of the 'democratic paradise' are hidden the autocratic governing practices. Thus, authoritarian leaders in the region relying on neo-patrimonial practices such as: clientelism, patronage, corruption, nepotism have managed to successfully create large informal networks and penetrate them into state institutions by extending control over them and state resources to the point of total capture of the state. Thus installing a hegemonic dominance within the polities of the Western Balkans region. A very important role in this initiative has played the legacy from the 90s, which is characterized by weakness of the state, high level of corruption, nepotism and clientelism.

Exactly, this article discusses the way of creating these informal networks through neo-patrimonial practices, their extension and penetration in state institutions and their effects in two dimensions: election and capture of the state based on a theoretical framework that takes into account the specifics of the Western Balkans and the legacy from the 90s. The concept of neopatrimonialism in this article is used in a way that implies the coexistence of official institutions with informal networks and the undermining of this money by the latter. Whereas, patronage, clientelism and corruption are considered an integral part of neopatrimonialism.

The central argument of this article states that the capture of the state in the Western Balkans region came as a result of the combination primarily of corruption, clientelism and state weakness. In this case, clientelism has served as a particularly appropriate instrument in setting up informal networks, while corruption in preventing the raising of state barriers, already weak since the 90s, that would make it impossible to fill institutions with clients as is the case with the justice system. This strategy of capturing the state is called in this article the soft strategy to describe its non-revolutionary nature, the lack of civil revolt against it and the naturalness with which it is installed.

**Keywords: neopatrimonialism; clientelism; corruption; state weakness**

**Dardan Beqiri** is an independent researcher from Kosovo\*. He completed his bachelor and master political studies in political science at the University of Prishtina.

**PANEL:**  
**CLIENTELISM FROM THE**  
**CLIENTS' POINT OF VIEW**

**10 December 2020**  
**12:00 - 13:30**

**Chair: Jovan Bliznakovski**  
**(Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)**

# **Discursive Strategies of “Normalisation” of Clientelism among Young Members of Political Parties in Serbia**

**Dragan Stanojević (University of Belgrade)**

Previous studies (Stanojević, Stokanić, 2013; Cvejić et al, 2015) on how the political field in Serbia functions show the existence of (party) clientelism. As in most post-socialist democracies (and developing countries), a low level of economic development goes hand in hand with a high level of distribution by the state which opens up the possibility of clientelism (van Biezen, 2004). Political parties in these societies are largely financially dependent on direct state funding (Cvejić et al, 2015), which has led to cartel parties dominating state institutions and to the emergence of a captive state (van Biezen, Kopecky 2014; Pesic 2007). The party structure is formed around a party elite that occupies key positions in administration, politics, and public enterprises, and that dominates other party structures and members. Its key role is to occupy and distribute public resources for the benefit of the party, members and potential voters (van Biezen, Kopecky, 2014: 117).

Contemporary debates see clientelism either as a form of rational decision-making by actors (Cornelius, 1975; Scott, 1977; Piattoni, 2001; Stokes, 2005; Geddes, 2012; Kitschelt and Wiklinson, 2007) or as part of normative obligations based on personal relationships and a sense of obligatory reciprocity (Lawson, Greene, 2014) or emphasise the significance of habitus, i.e. dispositions formed on the basis of life practices in a society and culture deeply imbued with informal forms of exchange and asymmetry of power (Auyero, Benzecry, 2017). We see the last aspect of clientelism important because it is most closely related to young people. Young people enter the world of politics with a certain motivation, but within politics, they form their expectations, practices, norms, values. Depending on how this field shapes them, it will affect not only their attitude towards politics, but also the attitude of young people in general towards political parties and democracy.

A significant role in this process of transmitting the requirements of the system of informal exchange, i.e. informal “rules of the game” to their generation, is played by young people who are members of party structures. Through certain language strategies, these actors “normalise” informal practices and clientelism in the political field. The aim of the presentation is to show different discursive strategies of normalisation of informal relations and clientelistic practices within the political field of Serbia by young members and officials of political parties.

We used the data from the qualitative study conducted in 2017 with 20 young people engaged in political parties during last elections aged 18-35. The sample was theoretical with three groups of respondents: party officials, party members and occasional activists.



In this research, we identified several discursive normalisation strategies, which we tentatively named:

1. Everyone does it; all parties (current and those before us), so it is in all aspects of society.
2. It has always been done this way; before the current government, during socialism, and even before that.
3. This is how it is done everywhere (even in the West); this is common only at the other level and in other countries.
4. We pressured into doing it (they see us as a hiring service); it's not our decision, but that's how things work and people expect it from us.
5. There are rules for how this works - this is not a spontaneous practice; it is clear how favours are earned; there are rules of exchange and stakes.

**Keywords: clientelism, discursive strategies, young people, Serbia, political parties**

**Dragan Stanojević** (1978) is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Sociology. His key qualifications are: 13 years of doing social research in Serbia and the SEE region, participation in national and international research projects. His research and policy work is focused on family relations, youth and children, education, social inequalities, social inclusion and life course patterns. Strong expertise and extensive experience in design and implementation of quantitative and qualitative surveys; familiarity with international methodologies: European social survey, LSMS, LFS, MICS, SILC, Time use surveys, World values survey, European values survey, etc.; statistical analysis including multilevel and structural equation modeling, and qualitative analysis (with software packages NVivo, MAXQDA, Atlas); preparation of analytical reports; policy analysis in various forms; dealing with sensitive issues.

# **Everyday State-Capture: Patronage Politics and the Client-Masses' Role. Evidences from the Balkans**

**Arianna Piacentini (EURAC research Bolzano)**

By focusing on patronage politics and patron-clients relations, this contribution looks at state-capture dynamics from the innovative perspective of the citizens' active role. Drawing upon empirical material collected in Bosnia Herzegovina and North Macedonia in the last few years, the article explores the interplay between economic deficiencies, political elites (business oriented) behaviour, and citizens' needs and interests in fomenting and legitimising the capture of their own states via their engagement into clientelistic and informal relations with their elites – eventually laying continuity to apparently dysfunctional and captured states. By informing a discussion going beyond the case studies, the article contributes to the current debate about democracy's flaws.

**Keywords: state-capture, clientelism, citizens' agency, Bosnia Herzegovina, North Macedonia**

**Arianna Piacentini** obtained her PhD in Sociology and Methodology of Social Research at the University of Milan in 2018. Her researches focus on ethnically divided societies, power-sharing, nationalism, patronage politics as well as patron-clients relations. She has been Visiting Researcher at the University of Cambridge (UK), SS. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje (MK), University of Sarajevo (BiH), as well as Research Fellow at the CAS SEE University of Rijeka (Croatia). Dr. Piacentini is currently Post-Doc Researcher at EURAC Research, Bolzano (South Tyrol, Italy), and Visiting Scholar at Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland (UK), at the Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict.

# Investigation into the Potential for Clientelistic and Corruptive Behavior of Students of Private and Public Universities in R.N. Macedonia

**Ivona Mileva, Marjan Bojadjev and Miodraga Stefanovska - Petkovska (University American College Skopje)**

**Introduction:** There is sufficient evidence in the scientific literature on the association between clientelism and corruption as they are often linked by conceptual similarities and common causes. However, the current research in the area is conducted dominantly using qualitative surveys. Despite the importance and implications of this phenomenon, there is a lack of quantitative instruments that would measure the potential for clientelism and corruption in a standardized manner.

**Aim:** By introducing a new quantitative instrument for potential clientelism and corruption, this article explores the potential clientelistic behavior of the young people living in Skopje through the dynamics of the triadic relationship authority-clientelism-corruption. It then evaluates its connection with a variety of demographic and socio-economic characteristics.

**Methods:** A quantitative questionnaire was designed; pilot tested and distributed among students from public and private universities in Skopje during September, 2020.

**Contribution:** The article provides a two-fold contribution: a methodological tool in the quantitative investigation of clientelism and corruption; and research knowledge into the potential for clientelistic behavior and corruption among young people in R.N. Macedonia.

**Keywords:** patronage, corruption, young people

**Ivona Mileva**, MSc, is Teaching Assistant and Head of Business Administration and Economics department at University American College Skopje. She is currently enrolled in DBA program at the same university. She has earned her MS degree in the field of luxury management from International University of Monaco. She has been involved in a number of research projects and conferences. Her research interests include organizational culture, entrepreneurship and leadership.

**Prof. Marjan I. Bojadjev**, PhD is a Provost and a full professor at University American College Skopje since the year of 2010. Previously, he has worked as CEO of the Macedonian Savings House from 1996 to 1999 and as CEO of the third largest bank in Macedonia from 1999 to 2004. Prof. Bojadjev has served as manager of several companies in Macedonia, as a board member in professional organizations and as a moderator in conferences on national Macedonian energy

and investment policies. He has completed his doctoral studies at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University – Skopje. He earned his Specialization degree in International Business Management at the University of Trieste. He has a Master of Science degree in Banking Marketing. Prof. Bojadjev completed executive education courses at Harvard Business School in 2008 and 2009.

**Miodraga Stefanovska – Petkovska**, MBA, PhD, is an Associate Professor at the School of Political Sciences and Psychology and School of Business Administration and Management, University American College Skopje. She graduated on the topic of individual and economic determinants of retirement and was awarded an honorary Masters in business administration on her research on wellbeing among the ageing workforce. Part of her doctoral studies was at Staffordshire University, United Kingdom as a scholar of the Open Society Institute on the topic of economic trust and cooperation among religious and ethnic minorities. She obtained a doctoral degree in social sciences and gender issues at the on the topic of discrimination and disparities in health care. Dr. Stefanovska-Petkovska has been awarded a certificate in Statistics for health research from Oxford University. Her academic research is focused on the area of medical sociology and sociology of health, with special emphasis on the intersection of employment and health, health literacy and self-efficacy. She has co-authored books and academic articles domestically and internationally and has been a mentor/co-mentor of over 20 master theses. She has also been an NGO activist for more than 15 years in the field of HIV/AIDS/STI prevention and management with special focus on vulnerable groups and she has participated, designed and coordinated numerous national and international projects on this issue.

## **ROUND TABLE:**

**“What’s Next for the Study of  
Clientelism in the Region?  
Possibilities for Cooperation of  
Researchers and Avenues of Research”**

**Moderator:  
Jovan Bliznakovski  
(Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)**

**10 December 2020, 14:30-16:00**

## **ROUND TABLE: “What’s Next for the Study of Clientelism in the Region? Possibilities for Cooperation of Researchers and Avenues of Research”**

The round table will bring together researchers on political clientelism working on the Western Balkan region with a goal to discuss a future research agenda. This conference session is organized at the time when the public awareness on the widespreadness and consequences of clientelism in the region is coupled with a growing scientific and policy interest on the topic. As demonstrated by the number of papers and authors featured in the conference “Political clientelism in the Western Balkans”, the study of political clientelism in the region is accelerating and has potential to contribute to the global research on political clientelism, as well as to the reform actions seeking to curb clientelism in the region.

The participants at the round table are invited to reflect on the following questions: What is the state of political clientelism research in our region of study? Which are the common themes and topics which are tackled by researchers? Which are the possible research directions and projects that can be tackled in the near future? How can the researchers on political clientelism develop and strengthen their cooperation? Is there any policy impact from the scientific work on political clientelism and how can we, as researchers, achieve such an impact?

In addition to the discussion on the above questions, the round table will also serve as a platform for discussion on one output which is envisioned with the project “Western Balkans Group on Political Clientelism”: the “Declaration of researchers on combating political clientelism in the Western Balkans” (tentative title). The Declaration has a goal to raise awareness on the consequences of the political clientelism in the region, as well as to provide scientifically derived input which can be used for combating political clientelism. During the round table, the participants, jointly with the conference organizers, will have the opportunity to discuss the text of the Declaration which will be later open for signatures to all interested researchers and scholars. The round table is open to all conference participants, as well as to all other interested researchers and scholars of political clientelism working on the Western Balkan region.

**PANEL:**  
**CLIENTELISM BEYOND ELECTIONS**  
**AND ACROSS SECTORS**

**11 December 2020**  
**10:00 - 11:30**

**Chair: Orinda Malltezi**  
**(University of Tirana)**

# **Between Public and Private Interest: Clientelism in the North Macedonia's Judiciary**

**Borjan Gjuzelov (Queen Mary University of London)**

EU-aspirant polities of the Western Balkans face numerous rule of law-related problems which undermine their democratisation efforts. The paper will analyse the nature of judicial clientelism in North Macedonia as one of the key obstacles for effective institutionalisation of EU-sponsored judicial reforms. The key argument is that these reforms are undermined by clientelistic networks resulting with ambivalent incentive structure where judges and prosecutors are faced with contradictory professional expectations. On one hand they are expected to apply the law impartially, while on the other hand, they are bound by the informal shared expectations of the clientelist network they belong to. Thus, instead of protecting the public interest, judges and prosecutors are expected to protect the political interest of the incumbent political elites in return for personal benefits and career advancement. Findings suggest that in the past 15 years, appointments, promotions and dismissals were largely abused by political elites as leverage to influence individual judges and prosecutors. Their loyalty was secured via promises of promotion or threats of dismissal, as well as with informal "interviews" with some of the key party officials to assess and secure their political appropriateness, similarly to the earlier Communist period. Moreover, despite the harmful effect on individual-level judicial independence and impartiality, this institutional parallelism and party insistence on stacking the judiciary with party loyalists at all judicial levels has had a detrimental effect on judicial meritocracy, especially in the higher instance courts where most of the party loyalists ended up as a reward for their loyalty. As a result, the EU-sponsored judicial reforms were destined to fail while informal influence flourished. The paper is based on an interpretative research approach focused on the personal understandings and experiences of judicial insiders, who have provided insights about the inner logic of clientelist ties within judiciary and their effect on their professional incentive structure.

**Keywords: clientelism, North Macedonia, judiciary, judicial reform**

**Borjan Gjuzelov** is a PhD candidate at Queen Mary University London. He has authored several articles and policy analyses on social capital, anti-corruption and participatory policy-making. Gjuzelov was part of the Horizon 2020 project INFORM – Closing the Gap between Formal and Informal Institutions in the Balkans (2016-2019).



# Political Clientelism and Private Security in Serbia

**Jelena Pešić (University of Belgrade) and  
Marko Milošević (Freelance researcher)**

The private security sector began to develop in Serbia during the 1990s. Along with the formation of the neo-patrimonial government in the 1990s, followed by developed political clientelism after 2000 and the system of competitive authoritarianism, the private security sector developed through privatization processes, establishment of domestic private security companies (sometimes in conjunction with organized crime or with the state), but also through development of the market by the inflow of international corporations. In this paper, we will try to examine how the system of political clientelism manifested and developed in the private security sector in Serbia. The main thesis is that privatization and the normative framework of public procurements, whose manifest goal was to prevent corruption, were the key factors that shaped the development of the private security sector in Serbia on a clientelistic basis, causing serious market distortions. Furthermore, we will try to explore whether new forms of clientelist relations are being formed within this sector. The paper will rest on the analysis of the findings of qualitative empirical research of the normative framework, context and actors belonging to the security sector in Serbia, conducted in the period from 2008-2019 by researchers from the Belgrade Center for Security Policy.

**Keywords: private security sector, clientelism, Serbia**

**Jelena Pešić** works as Assistant Professor at Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy - University of Belgrade (at the courses Introduction to Sociology II, Statistics in Social Research - Basics, Statistics in Social Research - Analysis, Theories on Social Change). She obtained her doctoral degree at University of Belgrade in 2016. Her main research areas encompass: values and value orientations, political clientelism, political participation and social movements, and class analysis.

**Marko Milošević** obtained his PhD in political sciences at The Faculty of Political Sciences - University of Belgrade (at the topic of comparative analysis of private security sectors in Serbia and Croatia). He worked as researcher in Belgrade Center for Security Policy and for the last five years he worked as civil servant at Office of the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection.

# How to Keep Religious Actors Loyal: Case of Law on Restitution of Religious Property in Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Vedran Obućina (University of Regensburg) and  
Domagoj Krpan (University of Rijeka)**

Since the end of 1990s wars in ex-Yugoslavia, religious institutions have been seen as loyal partners of political power in successor states. By their sheer authority in the (local) environment and legitimacy of religious vocation, Islamic and Christian clergy enjoy unprecedented positions in Balkan societies. Political parties have pursued a way how to control these positions and how to misuse religious communities for their political aims. This is even more accentuated in divided societies such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where three religious communities are often identified with three ethnic groups. In an atmosphere of mutual distrust and political clientelism within a single ethno-religious group, political actors formed ways to pressure the religious leaders, who in turn pressure their subordinates and theologians.

One such way is holding to old Communist forms of laws and religious liberties. BiH is among last ex-Yugoslav republics to revoke old laws on religious communities and has not yet passed a law on restitution of religious property. These properties, nationalised in Communist rule, belong to towns and municipalities, where political leaders are prone to give it back to religious institutions under clientelist conditions. "Good relationship" is defined as one where politics dictates societal processes and asks from the clergy not to be critical of them, to silence the theologians, and to show PR-wise closeness with political powers, in a form of religious legitimization of political actors. In return, religious institutions are awarded by financial means, property use / return, and media appearances. Many clerics do favour co-optation in such a way, hoping for a better outcome in such relationships.

This paper examines ways and cases of political-religious clientelist ties in BiH in the sense of promised (but never realised) return of property.

**Keywords: restitution, Bosnia and Herzegovina, religion, clergy**

**Vedran Obućina** is a political scientist and theologian from Croatia. He holds an MA in Political Science from University of Zagreb and MA in Theology from Old-Catholic Patriarchy. He is PhD researcher at the University of Regensburg in Germany. His academic work is focused on religion and politics, with an accent on peacebuilding possibilities of religious institutions worldwide.

**Domagoj Krpan** is Croatian philosopher and historian, PhD student in philosophy at the University of Rijeka, Croatia. He has broad interest in political philosophy and area history of the Balkans, and focuses on questions of fair society.

**PANEL: CLIENTELISM  
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**11 December 2020  
12:00 - 13:30**

**Chair: Klodiana Beshku  
(University of Tirana)**

# Public Administration Reform against Clientelism: Montenegro's Missed Expectations

Milena Muk (Institute Alternative Podgorica)

The paper follows the premise that “cornerstone of clientelism is personalized trust in a politician or in party brokers in place of impartial public administrators” (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci, 2017). Building upon the results of large-scale study which links clientelism to the failures of public administration reform (PAR) (Cruz and Keefer, 2015), the paper provides a qualitative insight into the interplay between political clientelism and PAR in Montenegro. It focuses on two particularly clientelism-prone areas: civil service recruitment and public financial management. The case study focuses on objectives and results of two consecutive cycles of PAR (2011-2016, 2016-2020), taking into account the key aspects of the wider context of the reform, namely one party predominance and the distinction between programmatic and clientelistic party appeals and their implications for PAR. The analysis of the most relevant sources on the reform results has been conducted with the caveat on the extent to which reform limited the political discretion in public administration recruitment/appointment and distribution of public funds. Analysis suggests that, in some instances, the reform has strengthened discretionary practices and consequently enabled political influence in distribution of public resources. While making certain concessions to the conditionality, applied by the European Union (EU), politicians were more resilient in making concessions in the areas which are politically opportune due to the predominantly clientelistic nature of the long-time standing ruling party in Montenegro. As a result, rather than restricting them, PAR perpetuated clientelistic practices in patronage appointments and distribution of public funds. Theoretical and policy implications of these findings are manifold. Since clientelistic parties tend to resist painful reforms in politically sensitive areas, PAR efforts should take into account the overall political dynamics and institutionalization of party systems. The further research is needed in order to detangle the nature of the relationship between party system institutionalization, types of parties and party systems in the Western Balkans and the effects of the public administration reforms, which are one of the fundamentals in the EU integration of the region.

**Keywords: clientelism, public administration, civil service reform, public financial management**

**Milena Muk** has been working at Institute Alternative, Montenegro's leading think tank, since July 2012, where she mainly focuses on research in the area of public administration reform, and overall fundraising, communication and advocacy efforts of the organization. She is a PhD candidate at University of Athens. Her academic research focuses on new institutionalism and Europeanization. Her

previous professional experience includes two years of work as journalist for Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, internship at Hellenic Centre for European Studies, and work for Centre for Investigative Journalism in Serbia. Her education background encompasses political science with the focus on the South East European region and media and communications. She is author of numerous publications of the Institute Alternative.

# **Civil Service's Reforms in Albania: Politicized and then Politicized**

**Nysjola Dhoga (University of Tirana)**

This presentation will analyze the politicization of the Albanian Civil Service in two dimensions: first, it will explain the evolution of the formal political discretion in the recruitment and in the career progress system of the civil servants by assessing and comparing the different reforms; second, it will try to detect by scrutinizing official and international reports, academical researches and politician's statements in the media, how these reforms have affected the material politicization of the civil service structure. A merit based, stable, professional and depoliticized civil service is a precondition for a democratic state. Introducing these values in the former totalitarian Albania where the party and the state were fused, has been a difficult task that resulted mostly as an outcome of the EU conditionality and the pressure of other international donors. In this perspective, Albania established the Civil Service System in the mid 90's and carried out several reforms of it until recently. However, the progress made formally to improve the legislative framework has scarce effect on the degree of partisan control over the appointments and career advancement in the public sector. Party patronage, although contrary to the law, is often part of politician's statements in the media and public promises during the electoral campaigns. Thus, the civil servants in Albania are constantly under political pressure and highly politicized.

**Keywords: Albania, civil Service, politicization, reforms, democratization, public administration**

**Nysjola Dhoga** (PhD) is a lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tirana. Her main interests are in the field of Albanian multilevel governance and public administration.

# Human Resources Management in Montenegrin Municipalities: A Tool for Generating Votes?

**Jovana Marovic (Politikon Network) and  
Maja Markovic (Open Dialogue Network)**

The beginning of the 80s in the Western Balkan saw the emergence of two important processes in public administration, those are democratization and decentralization. These two processes, especially the process of decentralization, were expected to increase the communication level between citizens and the authorities as well as to lead to the higher accountability of the public servants towards the general public, which should eventually lead to the reduction of corruption. However, the example of Western Balkan region shows that the very opposite thing happened- local level of governance became just one more level of the governance that provides space for corruption and that is suitable for development of clientelistic relations. In Montenegro, one of the main ways political clientelism is being manifested is through political employment on both national and local level. Political employment is especially visible on the local level where although the process of public administration optimization is officially ongoing, the number of public servants is continuously being increased. What is especially suitable for the development of the clientelist relations is a set of non formal rules that greatly determine organizational culture and dominant set of norms. The proposed paper aims to examine the scope of political employment on the local level focusing on three sample municipalities. In order to examine if political employment is something inherent to the ruling party or it is something deeply embedded into the Montenegrin political tradition, the research includes municipalities which have different political structures in power. In addition, the paper aims to explore in which measure has this type of clientelism affected the sense of responsibility civil servants are cherishing. The hypothesis is that public servants on the local level do not have a sense of responsibility towards citizens, but rather towards the party that has provided them with the job. Proposed paper also examines the level of success of different institutional mechanisms introduced with the aim to reduce corruption and increase the level of integrity and accountability.

**Keywords: local administration, employment, clientelism, Montenegro**

**Dr Jovana Marović** is Executive Director of the Politikon Network, a think tank based in Podgorica. She studied at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade where she received her doctorate. Between 2004 and 2016, Jovana worked as a Counselor for the European Union in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' multilateral department division. She also served as Advisor for International Relations and European Integration within the Cabinet of the Budva Municipality's Mayor, acted as Research Coordinator at the Institute Alternative and was Special Advisor to the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare. She is a member of the



BiEPAG and the Working Group for Chapter 23 of the European Commission's acquis on European neighbourhood policy and enlargement negotiations (dealing with Judiciary and Fundamental Rights), as part of the Montenegrin Accession Negotiations for EU membership.

**Maja Markovic** is one of the founders of Open Dialogue Network, an independent think tank dealing with public policies and public administration. She is Director of Research and Advocacy Programme at NGO Juventas, Montenegrin NGO active in the field of social policies and human rights. Maja has more than 10 years of experience in Montenegrin civil society during which she has implemented numerous projects and participated in developing different policy documents. Maja holds a MA degree in Public Administration obtained at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. She has presented her work at several international conferences organized by LSE, Sciences Po, etc.

**PANEL:**  
**CONSEQUENCES OF CLIENTELISM**

**11 December 2020**  
**14:30 - 16.20h**

**Chair: Bojana Naumovska**  
**(Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje)**

# **Electoral Rules and Corruption as Drivers of Political Fragmentation in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

**Nedim Hovic (Sant' Anna School of Advanced Studies)**

This paper explores fragmentation of the political landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina attempting to offer a solution to the puzzle of why, despite the ethnic cleavages and divisions the number of parties in BiH remains high. Using electoral data, scholarly literature, investigative journalism articles and semi-structured interviews with political party leaders as It identifies two main drivers of fragmentation: the electoral system and the highly corrupt environment conducive for political corruption as the main explanatory factors. Features of the election system of contemporary post war Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1996) as main drivers of fragmentation. First is the ethnic balance of elected and appointed representatives almost omnipresent at all levels of government and second a desire to make the system representative for it to be as close to citizens as possible. The first trait resulted in complex power sharing arrangements which provide for ethnic representation while the second trait was mirrored in low thresholds for entering local, cantonal, entity and state parliament, strong positions of mayors and preferential voting. Thus, the electoral system created an environment in which corrupt exchanges between parties and within parties flourished.

Still, what drove fragmentation further were the low levels of social capital, lack of intraparty democracy and a patrimonial tradition. We see this by examining the case studies of formation of some of the parties that have appeared on the political scene in the last few years. Some of the new parties were created as split parties without significant new ideology which would make them distinguishable from the original party, while others, primarily in Republika Srpska were created by the ruling party in order to weaken the opposition. But, in all of these instances corruption played an important role serving either as a justification for the split or for provision of opportunities for the split parties.

The paper concludes by examining the consequences of fragmentation finding that they vary. Some are negative: grand, yet dysfunctional coalitions at all levels of government, lack of responsibility from elected leaders and difficulties in establishing political responsibility for failure of public policy reforms. To others both a negative and a positive side may be attributed such as the relationship towards the fight against corruption while some are decidedly positive such as prevention of emergence of authoritarian leaders.

**Keywords: corruption, Bosnia and Herzegovina, political parties, fragmentation, electoral system**

**Nedim Hovic** is a Bosnian lawyer and a PhD candidate at Sant' Anna School of Advanced Studies. His main research interests include corruption studies, public international law and South East European politics. He worked in international, nongovernmental and political organizations in the Western Balkans on legal, political and developmental issues. He holds an LLM degree from Harvard Law School and a LLB from University of Sarajevo.

# **Corruption and Women's Access to Politics: Quotas and Party Funding in Kosovo\* and North Macedonia**

**Liljana Cvetanoska (University of Sussex)**

Although scholars such as Swamy et.al. (2001) and Dollar et.al. (2001) made connections between corruption and gender, a few explore the impact that corruption has on women. This paper, therefore, aims to get a better understanding of the impact that corruption has on women's access to politics by focusing on the cases of Kosovo\* and North Macedonia, both characterised by clientelist patronage networks and systemic corruption. The analysis focuses on gender quotas and electoral funding, two closely related issues crucial for women's involvement in politics.

The study argues that women's political participation is negatively affected by closely tied insider patronage male dominated networks and identifies direct and indirect obstacles to women's access to politics in Kosovo\* and North Macedonia. Such clientelist networks negatively impact women's access to politics, and women from marginalised groups are particularly affected. The findings confirm that the introduction of quotas in Kosovo\* has paved the path for descriptive representation of women in politics, but these efforts are limited by legal discrepancies and lack of women in leadership positions. Moreover, in both Kosovo\* and North Macedonia, party funding regulations are short of provisions on distribution of funds between male and female candidates for office. This hampers women's involvement in politics, which is already restricted due to the presence of political clientelism.

The paper relies on documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews with professionals working on corruption and/or gender-related issues.

**Keywords: patronage, gender, quotas, party funding, Western Balkans**

**Liljana Cvetanovska** is a Lecturer in Corruption, Law and Governance at the University of Sussex, UK where she teaches on several corruption-related modules at undergraduate and graduate levels. Her research interests include corruption in EU member states and candidate countries, and the impact that corruption has on gender. She is an active consultant on corruption-related matters for various international organizations. Liljana holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Sussex, an MA in Contemporary European Studies from the University of Bath, and an MA by Research in Law from Queen Mary University of London and a Bachelor of Laws degree from the "Ss. Cyril and Methodius" University. Her doctoral research examined the influence of the European Union's enlargement conditionality on control of corruption in Central and Eastern Europe.

# **Party Membership Card or Passport? The Effects of Corruption on Migrating Motivation: The Case of the Balkans**

**Đorđe Milosav (Trinity College Dublin)**

There is a growing number of migrants from conflict free and relatively well of middle income countries that current migration theories cannot fully explain. Furthermore, politically related individual level determinants of emigration are somewhat theoretically neglected since the existing literature is focusing mainly on economic explanations. Against this background, this paper provides a theory and empirical evidence of the impact of corruption perception on motivation to migrate. I argue that in middle income countries, higher individual corruption perception will lead to a higher propensity to make a migration decision, especially among political outsiders. These are individuals that have limited access to jobs and public services in corrupt contexts where only political insiders, usually those aligned with the ruling party, make use of clientelist networks. Individuals consider corruption as part of their cost benefit analysis of emigrating. Political outsiders are more likely to have motivation to migrate when they perceive high corruption because they do not have the ability to access benefits from corrupt networks. However, insiders will be less likely to have migrating motivations even when they perceive corruption rates to be very high. As long as insiders have access to benefits from corrupt networks they have fewer reasons to leave. I test the hypotheses utilizing the 2018 round of Balkan Barometer Data with respondents from the Western Balkans. The preliminary results from regression models provide support for the hypotheses. Therefore, this paper provides initial evidence for the claim that political factors have an effect on migration motivations in war-free middle income countries.

**Keywords: emigration, middle income countries, corruption perceptions, insiders, outsiders**

**Đorđe Milosav** is a 2nd year PhD candidate at Trinity College Dublin. In his PhD research project he is investigating why some citizens express high levels of state legitimacy in spite of lower levels of Quality of Government through the use of experimental designs and originally collected survey data. Milosav's main areas of interest include migration issues, corruption, political psychology and experimental designs. He received his Bachelor's degree at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade and his Masters degree at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, where he was admitted as a Swedish Institute Scholarship holder.

# **Political clientelism in Western Balkans - A Mechanism to Amplify Power Gain. Albanian Case.**

**Elira Luli (Albanian University)**

Political clientelism is not a new phenomenon in Western Balkans. Widely perceived as a “negative trend” throughout various research, different scholars have elaborated it as an existing fact until late in the region, mostly in the frames of “state capture” linked with corruption. This worrisome occurrence has recently begun to take on its conceptual, interpretive, and functional importance in the Western Balkans as a paradigm that impacts the economy, democracy, and society in many directions. This sort of trade-off agreement is well known to advancing specific groups’ interests linked with politics and public administration or institutions, while on the other side, boosting power gain and authority of various political clans, political leaders, or administration officials by releasing specific benefits related to public resources and providing access to the authoritative allocation of values for these kinds of groups or individuals.

Through a qualitative methodology, this paper explores available data, facts, reports, various media, and academic sources to bring through the deconstruction method a better understanding of this society’s plague, concentrating more broadly on the Albanian’s case. Different cultural backgrounds may shape specific forms of political clientelism. Following this perspective, this paper elaborates primarily on Albania’s cultural background and particularities of political clientelism that has merged, adopted, and developed in this context. Second, the analysis follows with the most trapped vital sectors, harvested by “specific groups” involved in this kind of “contingent exchange” on the grid, a lopsided procedure that leads to lack of transparency, prolonged transition, autocracy armored by top-level power gain - that also impacts sustainable development. The conclusion’s section will precede recommendations that try to explore theoretical approaches on how to uproot, to some extent, the manifold facets of this remarkable occurrence in this specific case of observation (Albania).

**Keywords: political clientelism, power gain/unlimited power, transition, vital sectors**

**Elira Luli** earned in 2017 a doctorate degree in International relations and Political science at the European University of Tirana. She participated in various international conferences, and her research topics revolve around Western Balkans studies, European Integration, Public Diplomacy, identity issues, interculturalism, also security matters. She defines herself first as a citizen of the Balkan region, and she really cares for the region. In the near future, she really wishes to see it prosper, have a sustainable development, and be an integral part of the European Union, mostly for the sake of the young generation who deserve a better future

at home. For this reason, her academic contribution focuses a lot on Western Balkan studies. Elira Luli is a political science lecturer at Albanian University and works simultaneously at the Press, Communication and PR office of the National Civil Protection Agency.





**Political Clientelism  
in the Western Balkans**

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